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The Ethiques of Aristotle, that is to saye, precepte of good behauoure and perfighte honestie, now newly trãslated into English.

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HIS RIGHT HO-nozable Lozde and Ma-ster Edward Earle of Der-by, His humble and obedi-ente Seruaunte Jhon Wylkinson, Sa-luteth.

ALthough the fe-ble and weric bodye, (right honorable lozd and Master) be satisfi ed with a restinge place: yet the mind cannot be so quieted oz re posed, but that of necessitie it is euermoze busi. Therfoze it shal be good foz euery mā to pzouide foz some vertuouse occupiyng, against the multitude of phā-tasies, wherin may be fixed the la bour of the mind, so that it stray

not to ferre in vaine. I therfore intending to discharge a part of my duty toward your Lordship haue translated this boke of the Ethiques of Aristotle, out of Italian into our vulgare toung, not for that your Lordship hath not seene them herebefore in the Italian tōg, but for the instructiō and edifiyng of others that haue not sene them in Englishe. Yet I can not boldli beseech your Lordshippe nor others being of more knowledge then I am to allowe this my symple dooyng: but rather to correct thesame, and not to iudge or deme in me any presumcion.

The ende of the preface.

The Ethiques of Aristotle.

Of Artes.

The first Chapiter.

Uery art, euery doctrine, euery operatiõ, and euery election, semethe to requite sõthynge to bee good: thẽ it was wel said of the Philosophers. Good is that whiche euery thing desireth. Accoꝛding vnto diuerse artes, diuers intencions: Some ben finished in woꝛkes, & other that bene no woꝛkes. Although they be many Artes oꝛ craftes, euerye one hath his finall intencion.

¶ Example, Phisike intendeth helth, & knighthod victoꝛy, ship

worke intendeth sailynge: Gouernance of houslolde intendeth to haue riches. There be Artes generall and artes also that bee speciall. ¶ Example, The science of knighthode is generall vnder the whiche ben conteined other artes particulars, as Sadelars, Armorers, & other crafftes which may be nedeful in batel, and these vniuersal be more worthy & more noble than bene the particulars, because, the particulars bee for the vniuersalles, as thynges whyche bee made by nature, andbeene an vtter and fynall vnderstandynge, vnto the whiche bene ordeyned al the operacion of these crafftes. As a man that shoteth at his pricke for his marke: So euery craft hath his final intent

whiche

whiche doth set forth the worke. Then the art Ciuil that teacheth to rule Cities is principall and soueraine of all other artes, for vnder her ben conteined diuerse artes. Rethorique is also righte noble, for why? she dothe dispose and set in order al the other that bee conteined vnder her: The fulnesse whereof and end, is the fulnes and intēt of al the other. Than the wealth that foloweth hir science is the welth of man, Because, it doth cōstrain from enyls. The ryghte doctryne is that a man procede therein accordynge as his nature maye sust ayne.

¶ Example, He that teacheth Geometry, ought to procede by strong argumentes, which bene named demonstraciōs: & he that

teacheth Rethozique oughte to
pzocede by argumentes sembla
bles oz very like. And this is
foz to witte, that euery artificer
shoulde iudge well and saye the
truthe of that whiche appertey=
neth to his craft. The science of
rulyng of cities belongeth not
to chyldzen, noz to men that fo=
loweth theyz owne wylles: Foz
they be not wyse in two soztes,
neither in age noz in manners,
yet somtyme olde of tyme and
young in maners, and childe of
tyme and olde in maners, then
to suche is conuenient to be ru=
lers of cities whyche be no chil=
dzen of maners noz folowers of
their owne willes.

¶ There be thynges whiche be
manifest vnto nature, and thin=
ges that be manifeste vnto vs,
from

from whence this science ought to be geuen. Of the thiges that be manifest vnto vs, a man that should study in this science and learne it, oughte to vse himselfe in thynges good, iuste and honeste. Also he ought to haue his mind naturally disposed to scyence. But a man that hath none of these thynges is vnprofytable to this science.

Of the thre liues. Ca. ii.

THe lifes of name & fame bene thre: the one is the life of cõcupyscence, the other is ỹ lyfe Ciuil: that is to saye the life of honour and prudence: the thyrde is the life contẽplatiue. There be many that liue bestly, which is cal-

led the life of concupiscence, for that they folow their willes, and echone of these liues is for their propre intent, deuided one from the other: as the arte of Phisike is deuided frō the art of knighthode, and as the Physician intendeth helth, so the knight will haue battayle and victory.

Of good. Capi. iii.

GOod is considered in two sortes, the one is good for hiselfe, another good is that a man desireth for other. Good for thy selfe is beatitude. Good for other is honoure and vertue. And why woulde a man haue these thynges, but for to be happy? A naturall thyng it is to euery man

to

to bee a Citiezen and to be accustomed with Artificers, and not naturally to inhabite i desertes there where is no company which naturally a man loueth. Beatitude is a thyng complete that nedethe none other thynge withoute it selfe, by the whyche the lyfe of man is laudable and glozious. Thē is beatitude the gretest welth and the most souereaiue thing a man can haue.

Here is deuided the powers of the Solle. Capi. iiii.

The Solle of man hath thze powers, one is called ỹ lyfe begitable: in ỹ whiche mā is partener with trees & with plantes: The second power, is the life sensible

in

in the whiche a man is partener with beastes, for why al beastes haue lifes sẽsible. The third, is called solle reasonable, by the whiche a man differeth from all other thinges, for there is none reasonable but man. And this power reasonable is sometyme in acte, and sometime in power, frome whence the Beatitude is whan it is in acte and not whan it is in power.

¶ Euery worke that a man doeth, is ether good or euell, and that man that maketh his work good, is worthi to haue the perfection of the vertue of his workes: as we wold say, he that harpeth well, is worthy to haue the prayse of his art, and the euel to haue the cõtrary. Thẽ if the life of man, be according to the operaci-

racion of reson, than his life is laudable, whan he leadethe it accordyng to his propre vertue. But when many vertues be gathered together in one mans liuyng, then the life of that man is most best and muche honored & much worthy, so that it can be no more. For it is not one vertue that maketh a mā blessed or happy, No more than one Swalowe is a perfight token of the newe spring. Then it is not in a lytel time of the life of man, that he doeth good workes, nor can be said, that man is happy.

¶ Of thre maner of welthes. Capitulo.v.

Welth is deuided in thre partes, the one is the welthe of the solle, the other is the welthe of the bodie, and

and the other is the welthe with out the body. And of these thre the welth of the Solle is moste worthy, and the fourme thereof is not knowen but in woorkes, which be with vertue. ¶ Beati tude cõsisteth in the obteinyng of vertues & in the vsig of thẽ. But whã beatitude is in a man in habite and not in dede or act, than he is vertuous as a man that sleapeth, whose vertue and whose woorkes are not manifest, but of necessitemust nedes woork accordyng to the arte, and is in similitude to him that standeth in trauers and feightes, obtaineth & hath the croũe: although there be no more stronger than he that hathe the victory, yet he hathe not therfore the crowne because he is most strõg, except

he

he feighte: Albeit by his power he get the battayle. And so the rewardes of vertue, a man hath not if he bestowe not himselfe in vertue actually: and this is for because the reward is the Beatitude which he hath so long as he worketh ỹ workes of vertue.

¶ The iuste manne deliteth in iustice, the wyse man in Sappyence, the vertuous man in vertue. And euerye worke whyche is doone by vertue, is faire and delectable in it selfe. Beatitude is a thing Jocound & pleasant.

¶ Beatytude that is in yearth hathe neede of outewarde healthe, for it is impossyble to a man to dooe faire woorkes and to haue Arte, whyche is seemyng to good and vertuous liuing, with abũdance of frẽdes.

prospe

prosperitie of fortune, withoute good outwardly. And therfore it is nedefull to haue withoute forthe, wherby may be the more manifest the honour & value of man. And if any gifte be geuen to man in this worlde from the glorious God, it is a worthye thynge to beleue this to bee the Beatitude, because it is the best thyng that may be in man. For whi: it is an honorable and complet fourme of vertue. There is no generacyon nor kynde that can hauc vertue and beatitude but man. There is nether child nor beaste that can haue Beatitude, for whi: ther workes be not according to vertue. Beatitude is a thing stedfast and fyrm accordig to very dispositiõ, wherin nether falleth variaunce nor permu=

permutaciõ, as for to haue now well and nowe euill, but euermore well, and this is the goodnes that is in the workes of mã. The pillers of beatitude be the operacions which a man doth accordig to vertue. The pillers of the contrarye, be those that a mãn doth accordyng to vyce.
These workes be stedfaste and stable in the minde of man, and the vertuous manne is not moued nor trobled in him selfe for anye thyng that maye happen contrarye, for then he shoulde neuer haue felicitee if he be troubled, because sorowe taketh awaye pleasure from felicitie.
There be thiges which be hard to be born: but whã a man hath borne theim pacientlye, he hathe shewed the strẽgth of his mind:

and there be thinges also which be light to beborne, in the sustai nyng whereof there is no great prudẽce shewed therein. A hard thyng it is to sustaine sickncs & death of chyldren: yet although they be strange and harde, they mouenot a man from his Beati tude. The happynes of the man that is wel fortuned, is so much to be praised, as a thing sent frõ God, and is so much to be hono= red & cõmended: that their laud & praise can not be spoken: & spe cially, it shal become vs to glori fye, honor & magnify almyghty god aboue al thinges, & we ou= ght to thinke him in him self to haue in his thought algoodnes & felicite, For whi: he is the begi ning & cause of algoodnes. Feli cite & beatitude ar one certẽ act, the which procedeth of ỹ solle &

of the body. And like as the perfect phisiciã seketh ⁊ sercheth diligẽtly the nature of the body of mã to thentẽt to cõfirm it in hel the: Likewise it belongeth vnto good rulers ⁊ gouerners of cyties to loke studi ⁊ prouide to cõserue the form of felicite in ẏ mĩdes of their citizens, ⁊ for to put them in comfort to worke according to vertue which is the precious frute ẏ cõmeth of felicite.

The powers of the solle, Chapiter. vi.

The solle of mã hath diuers powers, as one called the power irracional: that is to say vnresonable, wherein a manne differeth not frõ plãtes ⁊ brute beastes. And therefore thys is not the propre power in manne. For by this power manne may

worke his operacion sleapyng. The other is the power intellectiue, according to whose work after the forme aforsaid, is good and euell. And this power worketh not in slepynge but manyfestely, & therfore it is said, that the miserable differeth not from the good in the lymittes of this life. For in the tyme of sleape, which is the good, such is the euel, and is because that man resteth from the worke by the whiche he is called good and euell: but this is not treuth generallye, because the myndes of the good, seeth somtimes in visions and dreames many good thynges and profitable, Whiche be not sene in the mindes of eiuell men. The other power that the solle hath, although it be not racionall.

cionall. yet it taketh part with reason, therefore it oughte to obey vnto the vertue of reason, and this is called the vertue cō cupissible. And a man oughte to knowe that in the solle there ar somtime contrary mouinges lyke as are in the bodye, as whē one membre moueth in the Paralitico or Paulsye it musse moue againste nature: but this cōtrary is manifest in the bodi, and in the solle hid and secrete.

¶ The power racional is to be said in two sortes, the one is the power which is very resonable: that lerneth deserneth and iudgeth. The other power, vnreasonable, that is to saye, the power concupissible, and is called reasonable as long as it is obedyent & vnder the power of that

which is veri reasonable, as the good child vnto the father, whi che receaueth his correction.

Of two maners of ver= tues. Chapter. vii.

Here bee two ver= tues, one is called Intellectuall, as Sapience science and prudence: the other is called Mozall, as cha= stitie, liberalitie and humilitie, then if we wyll prayse a manne in vertue Intellectuall, we say this is a wise man and subtil in vnderstandynge, and whan we will praise a man for his mozall vertues, that is to sai in his ma ners, we say this is a chast man and a liberall.

Howe

Howe vertue groweth in man. Chapiter. viii.

Although there be ii. vertues, the one intellectual, & the other mozal, the Intellectuall ingendzeth and groweth by doctryne & learnyng. And the mozal likewyse ingendzeth & groweth by good vse and custome, and this vertue mozal is not in vs by nature, foz naturall thynges cannot be moued from their disposicions by contrary vse.

¶ Example, the nature of the Stone is to goo downwarde, and cannot be caste so hygh but that it pzealeth downe agayne. The nature of the Fyer is to gooe vp: and can not bee dzyuen so fayre downe but that

it preaseth vpwarde. And vniuersally, nothyng naturall can naturalli worke against nature Thē these vertues be not in vs by nature: the power to receaue them is in vs by nature, the accomplisshynge is in vs by vse. Thē these vertues be not put in to vs by nature, but the rootes and fulfillyng of the recepte of thē, is in vs by nature: and the fulnes and perfection of theim cōmeth to vs by vse. Euert thig that is in vs by nature, is in vs first bi power: and after cōmeth to the acte, as it commeth to the senses of man. For firste a man hath power to see & to here: and after by this power he heareth and seeth: and a man seeth not nor hereth before he haue the power to heare and see: then nowe

we

we see that in these thynges of nature: the power goeth before the acte, and in thynges moral, all contrary, for the acte and the worke goeth before the power. ¶ Example, A man hathe the vertue that is called Justice because he hathe dooen ofttymes the workes of Justice: Also the vertue of Chastitie: for that he hath diuerse times wrought the workes of Chastitie. And so it is of Artificers, a man is called a Carpenter because he hathe wrought lõg in that art & craft: Art wil not be had without lõg tyme bestowed therin. Like as the Minstrel, by the long vse of Instrumẽts, bereth the name of that arte: and the good man is good by his good workes, and euel for doynge euell: one selfe

thyng ingendzeth in vs vertu-
es & corrupteth. If this thing
be done diuersly, it is by vertue
as it is by healthe, for one selfe
thig done in diuers fashions is
both cause of helth & corrupciō.
¶ Example, labour temperate
is helth to mā, and if it be little
it corrupteth, to much or to litel
corrupteth, & to kepe the meane
conserueth. ¶ Example, feare
& folyshe hardinesse corrupteth
the valiantnes of man, for whi-
the fearefull fleeth from euerye
thyng. And the hardye assaileth
euery thyng, beleuing in hīselfe
to bring it to passe: nother in the
one nor in the other there is no
doutinesse, for prudence is in
keping the meane betwene fear
and folyshe hardynes. For a mā
ought to fle & assail there where
it is

it is to assail. And so it is to bee vnderstād in al vertues, as it is to be vnderstande in prudence: that vertue is gotten & kept by holdyng of the meane.

How a man is vertuous

Chapyter. ix.

NOwe it is nedefull to make distinctiō and put a differēce betwene habite, which are without vertue by grefe or by ioie, whiche be done in their workes.

¶ Exāple, he ẏ sustaineth carnal wils, & of the abstainig frō thē reioiseth, is called chast, & he that sustaineth carnal will and morneth is called lecherus, & specially he that sustaineth terrible thīges & not trobled therwith, is called prudēt and strōg, and he

that

that sustaineth perillous thynges and troubled with them is called fearful. Euery operacion and euery fashion foloweth plesure or displeasure. Then euerye vertue is wyth delyghte or with greefe: and therfore the gouernours of Cities do honor delectacions and plesures dewely taken: and scourge with dyuers tormentes delectacions not dewely taken.

¶ The thre desires of Man. Chapiter. x.

THe thinges that man willeth & desireth bee thre: oneis profitable, the other delectable & the third good. The thinges cõtrary be also three, nether profitable, delectable, nor yet good. He that vseth reasõ in these thinges

ges is good: And he that vseth not reason in these thynges is euell. And specially in delectacion, for why? it is noryshed with vs frō our natiuitie. And therfore it is a great thing for a mā to haue ryght measure in delectacion. Then al the vnderstandyng of this oure boke, is to haue delectacion with reason: and to haue reason in harde thiges it behoueth to haue art. Then the vnderstanding of artes was out of the science Ciuill: So that it geueth delight vnto his citiesens, in thiges which be cōuenīēt, as where, whan & how muche, and who that vsethe of these thiges wel, is called good: & he that doth contrary is euell.

How we a man is vertuous. Chapi. vi.

To de-

TO demaũd how a man is iuſt accoꝛding to the woꝛks of iuſtice, and how he is temperat, doing the woꝛkes of tẽperaunce, a mã might ſay that it is like vnto theſe two vertues. As of grã mer, and to that man that is cal led a Gramarion, that ſpeaketh accoꝛding to Grammer: but in trothe it is not like, from the art to vertues, foꝛ why: in art, that a man be good it nedeth not but to knowe, but in vertue knowe ledge ſufficeth not, withoute woꝛke: foꝛ to knowe withoute woꝛke it auaileth not. Like vnto this is the ſicke which vnder ſtandeth al the commandement of the Phiſician, and dothe not thereafter. Such ſickneſ is fat from

from health, so be men farre frō Beatitude if they haue vertues and worke them not.

How vertues ar inhabit,

Chapyter. xii.

N the solle of man are three thynges habite, power, and passions. Passiōs be these, Joye, desire, loue, enuy, and hate: the powers be natural by the whyche we may do the forsaidthinges. Habyte is where a man is praised or dispraysed, thē I say that vertue is no power nor passyon but habite: for nother by passiō nor power, man is prayscd nor dyspraysed: but rather by habitee standyng and permanent in the solle of man.

What

What vertue is

Chapiter. xiii.

Vertues be founde in thynges that haue a mean betwene extremities, which are ether to muche or to littel: and this meane is in ii. sortes, one accordig to nature, & thother by cõparison, & is called meane accordynge to nature, this in al thing is one self thing

¶ Example, if. x. be to muche & vi. is to litell. then. ii. is to be a meane, for why: vi. be so muche more then. ii. as they be les then x. the meane by comparison to vs is this, nether to muche nor to littell.

¶ Example, yf takyng a great quantitie of foode be to muche,

and

and a litel quantitie to litel, the meane maye be vnderstande in our handelyng, nether to much nor to littel. Euerie artificer in his art inforseth himself to kepe the meane, from thextremitees. Thē the moral vertues be those workes, in the whiche to muche and to litell be aduoyded and abolyshed, and the meane to bee praised. Then vertue is one willing habite, that standeth in the midward to vs, from whēce the reason is determinate.

¶ There is but one waie onely to do wel, and mani waies to do euil: wherfore it is a hard thing and a laborus to be good, and a light and easy thing to be euell: & ther be mo of the euell sort then of the good. There be thiges in the which there can no mean be

founde, because they be naught at all, as theffte, manslaughter, treason, and adultry: so there be thynges, whiche bee vertues, and haue no extremities: As temperaunce and fortitude: for the meane hathe no extremitee in it selfe. Fortitude or strength is a meane betwene feare and folish hardinesse: & Chastite is meane betwene the man that foloweth his wil, and he that vtterly forsaketh it. Liberalite is the mean betwene prodigalite & Auarice, for the prodigall is lesse in receiuing, then he is in geuing, and the couetous contrarie, but the mā that is liberal kepeth the meane betwene these two extremities. Liberalite, truth, and prodigalite in litel and mean thinges: but in greate thynges the

meane

meane is called Magnificence, the supabūdāce hath no name in Latin, but in Greke it is called Pleonasmonus, & the lyttel is called Pernesa, Meane in the wil is equanimite, that is to sai, equalnes, Equanimite are those that wil not to much. The Magnanimus is he that willeth to much, and he that wil not is called pusillanimus. A mā that angreth with a thing so much as it behoueth, is called meke: & he that is angri with a thig withoutcause is called Irefull: and he that is not so angry as he should be is called Inirascibile or angerles, truthe is in the myddes betwene the twoo extremees, that is betwene ouermuche and to lytel. Those which kepe the meane betwene these two thynges,

be called trusty, and thei that ouerpasse be called vaunters or boasters. And those that bee to short in these thynges, be called humble: and they that kepe the meane in thes thinges of sporte & plaie, be called in Greke Metrocalor and they that ouerpas, be called skoffers, and they that lacke, be called haskardes: and he that kepeth the meane in cõpany is called cõpaniable: and he that passeth the mean loking for no gaynes, is called a good felowe: and he that passeth the middest, and al forgaines, is called a flatterer. Shamfastnesse is a passion of the minde and no vertue, and they that holde the meane in shame, be called shamfaste, and they that bee more ashamed than nede is, be called

in

in Greke Recoples and they whi
che shame, lesse than thei shulde
are called shamelesse.

Howe to knowe ver=
tues. Chapiter. xiiii.

Hre dysposicyons
ben in the workes
of man: that is to
saye, muche, lyttel
and mean. And al
thes thre thynges
bene contrary emongest theym
selues. For lyttell is contrary
to muche, and the meane is con=
trarye to theym bothe: that is
to saye, to lyttell and to muche,
whence yf thou wylte make cō=
paryson, betwene the meane
and muche, we maye say to mu=
che: and yf we wyll make com=

parison, betwene the meane and litel, we may say to litel: whence yf thou wilt make comparison, betwene prowes and feare, ther prowes shalbe called hardines, and yf a man will compare, betwene prowes and hardines, be rely they? prowes shalbe called fear. But it is to be knowē that ther is a greater contrary fro n the one extreme to the other, thē it is from the meane to the extremes, yet the one is more nere to the meane then is the other.

¶ Example, hardynes is more nearer to prowes then is feare, and prodygalitee is more nearer to Lybcralitee then is Auarice, but the sencibilite of the carnall wyll, is more neare vnto Chastitee, then it is to Lechery, and that is by two reasons, the

one

one reason is accordynge to the nature of the thynge, the other is of oure parte by nature, and thys is the reason whereof that fear is more contrari vnto Fortytude, then is hardynes of our parte: because the extremytees vnto the whiche we been moste ready to fall by nature, been the furtheſt frō the mean, and therfore we fal more redily vnto carnal deſires, then we do to the cōtrary. Then in ſo much that vertue is in the meane, and to take the mean there nedeth ſo many conſideraciōs, it is a hard thing for a man to become vertuous. Euery art apperteneth to euery mā, & euery man ought to lern, ſpecially ſuche as are wiſe and expert therin, for euery man can not find the point of the cercle,

but he onely that is wise in Geometry. Can do and wyl do the thynge, is lightlye sayde, but to do with al dewe circumstance appertcineth onely to them that be wyse in that arte. Euery operacion that kepeth the meane is faire and worthi reward, and for this cause we oughte to incline our mides, contrary to our desires wherby we may come to the mean, although it be a hard thyng at the fyrst. Then in al thynges the mean is to be prayse, and the extremities to bee blamed.

Chowe a man doth wel and euel. Chapiter. xv.

There bee operacions which a man doth not with his will, that is to saye by force or by igno-

ignozance, as if the wynd shuld take a manne and cary him into another countreye. There be other operacions, whiche a man doth willyngly by his own consẽt as a man that doth a wozke of vertue oz vyce by his pzopze wil. And there be other operacions whiche be part by his wyl, and parte not accozdyng to hys wyll: as yf a man beyng vppon the Sea in time of tempest and casteth fozth his harnes & stuffe to saue him selfe: oz as it hathe bene sene, that the lozd hath cõmaũded his subiect to slaie hys father oz mother in pain of life. Such operacions be not cõpoũded of the wozkes of wil noz inforced: yet if thou do it, thou doest it by thy wil, although thou dooe it by commaundemente,

therefore suche woorkes haue prayse and dispraise. A man ought rather to die, then to doe so fylthy a thing, as to kyll father or mother, or to do any such like thynges. Lacke of wit and discrecion is the cause of all euell, for lacke of knowledge what is to be done, & what is not to bee done, is the onely cause of the increase of euel mē. In this knowlage, the mind seeth not the euil name and peril that they run in to. Thinke you a dronken man and Ireful, when he dothe any euell dede, that he doth it by ignorance without knowledge, although he be ignorāt in his dede. Neuertheless, the cause of the malice is not without hym, for why? the science of a man cā not depart from him. Then the

cause

cause of the cõcupiscence of this euel, is but in the euel doer, that foloweth hys wyll: for it is impossyble, that a man may do wel by his wyll, and euell withoute his wyl. And lykewyse the wyll is more common and more generall then is the election. For why? the operacyon of the wyll, is common with Beastes and childzen, but the election apperteineth not but to him that abstaineth him self from concupiscence. Somtimes a man wold haue a thyng that is possible, & yet doth chose for it that whiche is impossible. Also the wil is thẽtent, but the electiõ is an antecedẽt vnto thentẽt, for why? electi on goeth before the operacion: & the operacion goth after. And a mã is called good or euel by the

worke: but by the election he is nother called good nor euyll.

¶ Also the opinion is of truthe or falsehode: but the election is of wel or euell. And like oppynions are of those thynges that a mã knoweth not sureli. But the election is of those thinges whi che a man knoweth of a suretie. yet euery thing is not to be chosen, but those wherein a manne hathe had councell before. And yet councel is not to be kepte in euery thing: But of those wherin wyse men take councell, but of the thynges whereof fooles coũcell is no coũcel to be made, but these thinges which be weightie and maye be done by vs, the Issue beyng doutefull, that is to saye doutefull in the ende. There be thynges whiche be to

haue

haue councell, as to geue me-
dysyns to a sycke manne or like
thinges. Of other thinges, whi
che appertayneth not to vs, ne-
deth no counsayll, as to kepe
councell vppon thynges that
be perpetuall, and of necessitie:
as whether the sonne ryse in the
mornyng, or yf it rayne or not:
nor yet to councell of thynges
that come by chaunce, as too
fynde a Purse or other trea-
sure: nor yet to councell vppon
the ende, but rather vppon the
thynges that go before the end.
¶ The Physicyan counsaileth
vpon the lyfe of the sycke, and
counsayleth howe he maye he-
ale hym. The Rhethorician
counsaileth not vppon persua-
syons: and he that maketh the
lawe, counsayleth not of the be-
atitude,

atitude, but rather euery man counsayleth in those thinges by the whyche they maie come to the thynges that be nedefull to theyr arte, by him or by his frē-des, as he woulde to hym selfe. The wyll is the ende of the in-tente as it is sayd aboue, where it semeth to some men that to be good which please them, & other there be to whom it semeth that all is good that the most would haue cōmonly: but according to the truthe it is not so, but good is that whiche seemeth good to them that be good, that iudge thinges as they bee, and iudge as doth the whole man, that iud geth that swete, which is swete, and that bitter, which is bitter. But the sicke man doth al cōtra rye, for he iudgeth bitter to bee swete,

swete, & the swete bytter, and so vnto an euel man that which is good seemeth euell, and that is euyll good, and this is because the euel man taketh not delight to be good, but that he delyteth to be euell: and there be manye sicke of this naughty syckenes, because the woorkes good and euell be in their iugemēt. Then it is in vs to do wel, & also it is in vs to do euel, and somtymes it is by the woorkes of man as it is with chyldren, put the case that some be naught, the father thynketh hym good. And that good and euel is in vs, it appeareth by thē that made the law, whiche scourgeth theim that do euell with dyuerie paynes, and geueth honoure to theym that do well. The lawes put men in

comfort

comforte to doo wel, and constrayne them from euell, and no man comforteth another to doo that thynge that is not in his power. There is none that wyll aduyse a manne to mourne for that thyng that he shoulde sorow: nor there is none that wyll beare a man in hand, he shal not warme standing nere the fyer, & that he bee not thyrsty nor hungry: and they that made the lawes punishe men for suche Ignorauce wherein thei be gilty. And it is to be knowē that there is doble ignorance, one is this of the which a man is notcause, as the ignorauce of the foole, and for thys a manne is not to bepunished, another ignorance whereof a man is cause, as the ignorauce of a dronken man,

and

And for that a man ought to be punished, for euery manne that passeth the commaundementes of reason and of the lawe, ought to bee punished, and euery man that is iuste, or cuill, is suche, because he will bee suche. But when a man is made iuste or ecuill, he is not become iust, bycause he would become iust: As it happeneth to a man that was wonte to bee whole and is sicke and is not healed bycause he had no will that he would not beleue the Phisicion, nor vse the thynges that conserueth health And such like is he that casteth a stone, that before he casteth it, it is in his power to holde it: But when he hath caste it, it is not in his power to holde it nor in his will. And so it is in a man

that becometh euil: in the begin
nyng it is in his power to bee
come good.
¶ Malice is not onely in man
by will: But moze ouer it is in
the body. As a man to bee blind
and lame: and these euils maie
be in two soztes, ỹ one is by na-
ture, as he that is bozne blind &
lame, the other maie come by a
mannes owne foly. As by them
that dzinke theimselfes blynde,
oz fall to stealyng oz other euill
dedees. Of suche there is no pe-
ty to bee taken excepte thei re-
pente and amende theim selfes.
Then euery manne is the cause
of his owne imaginacion, foz
that a manne hath naturall vn-
derstãdyng to knowe good and
euill. Then ought wee to will
to dooe well and to flie from e-
uill

uill. And it is the beste thyng, and not impossible to take a custome and doctrine in goodnes, and he that taketh it at the beginnyng and continueth, suche a man hath a good nature and perfight. And who that taketh the cõtrary hath an euil nature But although it be euil he may make it good if he wil: For it is in him to take what he wil, then vertue and vice is accordíng to the will of manne. But marke this, that operacion and habite bee not accordyng to the will of man in one sorte but in diuerse. For why? The operaciõs from the beginnyng to the ende is in the power and will of manne. But the habite is not in the power nor in the will of man if it be not at his beginnyng.

¶ The.xvj.Chapiter.

¶ Of Fortitude.

Let vs speake now of euery habite, & begin at strength. I laie that strēgth is accordyng as it is said before, a meane betwene feare and hardines. For ther be thynges that a man ought reasonably to feare, as vices and euery thing that putteth a man in an euill name: and thei that be not afraied of these thynges be shameless and worthy to bee blamed: And thei that be afraid of these are to be praised. There be men that be hardy in battail and there be that bee liberall in spendyng money: but the verie strong man is nether more nor

lesse

lesse then nedeth, and is redy in all these thynges as nedeth to sustain: But the irefull man exceedeth in these thynges, and the fearefull man lacketh in theim. The thynges that be to be feared bee not of one nature but of many sortes. For there bee diuerse thynges that are to be feared of al men that haue wit and vnderstandyng: for he that feareth not thonder and the waues of the sea is not wise. And there be other thynges that euery mā fereth not, and those thinges be accordyng to the more or lesse: that is to saie, accordyng as on thyng is more to be feared then another. And as I saie of thynges that bee fearfull, so it is to be vnderstand of hardines. For there be men that wil shewe thē

selfes hardy before thei come to the dede, and make a great face, but when thei come to the deede beare themselfes not valiaunt. But a bolde man & strong doth the contrary, that before he cum to the deede holdeth hym still: and when he cometh to the dede he is hardy & strong. Strength is in fiue sortes, the first is ciuil strength, because that menne of Citees suffre muche and many perels to haue honor and to bee blameles of their citezens. The second sort is by wit and policie that a manne hath in his office: As we se of men that be wise in feactes of armes, that do great thynges trustyng in their Science, and bee not strong accordyng to the truthe, bycause that when thei se the daunger of bat

taill

taill, thei flee beeyng moze a-
frated of death then of shame.
But he that is strõg accozdyng
to the trueth, ought to dooe the
contrary and to stande faste in
battaill, and feare moze shame
then death.

The thirde sozte is by furye
as we se in wylde strength, that
be strõg and hardy by the great
furoz that is in theim, this is
not the very strength, foz who
so euer putteth hymself in perel
by ire oz furye, is not to bee cal-
led strong. But thei that putte
theim selfes in perell by a right
vnderstandyng, those be strong

The fourth sozt is by strong
mouyng of cõcupiscence, as we
maie se of bzute beastes in tyme
of their copulaciõ, and so many
men let theimselfes fall lightly,

and thei that kepe wel themselfes be strong.

The fifte sorte is by suretie wher a man hath had oft tymes victory: as he ỹ fighteth with one that he hath oft ouercomen, but when he fighteth with an other, there he leseth his hardinesse & strength. These fiue sortes be not the very strength: for strēgth is a more worthy thyng then Chastite, for it is a lighter thyng for a man to abstain hym self from carnall concupiscence, then it is in thynges of griefe.

¶ The.xviij. Chapiter.

¶ Of Chastitee.

Chastitie is the meane betwene folowyng al the delectaciõs of the body or not to folow.

For

For a man to delight hymselfe in thynges conuenient: where and when, and how muche, there nedeth no Chastite. For seeyng of faire thynges, & hering of mery tales, and smellyng of flouers: how muche whē and as it behoueth, there nedeth no Chastitee. For Chastitie nedeth not but in two sēces of the body, that is to sai, in the tast and felyng, in the whiche we begin with brute beastes very strōgly, as delighting theinselfes in thynges that thei eate, drinke, and touch: and specially in touchyng is greate delectacion, and therefore it is a beastly thyng to folowe to muche the delectacion of touchyng For in the tast, a manne delighteth not somuch as in touching For the delectacion of tastyng

is onely when a manne examineth the sauor. There bee naturall delectacions in the whiche a man may haue measure, as in not to muche eatyng and drynkyng. This mesure may be called Chastitee, for the vnchast is in the delectacions of the body and not in thynges of griefe, for in thynges of griefe the meane is to be vnderstande, strength. Some tyme a man is not temperat nor chast when he delighteth more then is due, and when he maie haue the thynges that he desireth, it is hard to finde a mā that delighteth himself lesse then he should in carnall delectaciōs, suche one hath no name set. Then thei be chast that kepe the meane in delectacions, that is to sai, delight to muche in ha

uyng

uing of them, nor sorowe not to muche in leſing thē, but delight hymſelf temperately, contente with ſufficiente to the good life of man. It behoueth a manne to withſtande the deſire of delectacions, for if a manne lette reaſon bee ouercome, it remaigneth vnder deſires, therefore it is nedefull to manne to bee chaſt from youth and to liue vnder commaundementes, or elſ ſhall remain with him, deſire to a greater age. And therefore it behoueth vs to ſtudie that reaſon maie remaine aboue deſire or concupiſſence.

¶ The.xviij.Chapiter.

Of liberalite or Largeſſe.

Liberalite

Liberalite is a meane in geuyng & in receiuyng of money: then he is liberall that vseth money conueniently: that is to say, he that geueth it, wher when, and how muche it behoueth, and to whō. Prodigall or a waster, is he that exceedeth in geuyng & wanteth in receiuing And the coueteous is the contrary. And it is mete that liberalitee bee more in geuyng then in receiuyng: For why? It is a lighter thing, not to receiue, thē to geue. And it is a more laudable thyng to geue the thyng where it is conueniente, then is to receiue the thing that is conueniente. And generally, it is a more worthy thyng in vertue to do well, then it is to abstain frō euill.

euil. Neuertheles in these thyn-
ges ought to bee an equalitiee,
that is to saie litle praise to thē
that receiue temperatly but thei
that geue temperatly are to bee
praised, bicause thei profite him
that receiueth the gifte. He is
not liberall that is sory for his
gifte: For he geueth it not by li-
beralitee, but rather for shame,
or other cause.

Thē he is liberal that geueth
cherefully: he that is liberall is
cōtent with litle, so ẏ he maie do
for many muche or litle. For he
euer inforceth hymself to worke
liberalitee, accordyng to his fa-
cultie it, is harde to fynd a man
liberall & riche, for riches incre-
seth not by geuyng: but increa-
seth by receiuyng. And it is oft
seen that the riches that a man

hath

hath without labour maketh him liberal. And great maruell it is when a manne is riche by great labor if he be liberal. The Prodigal manne is not so euill as the coueteous, for the coueteous is nether good to hymselfe nor other, & therfore euery man hateth hym. Also the Prodigall may be remedied diuerse waies But the coueteous cannot bee healed: and naturally a man is more geuen to Auarice then to prodigalite: and departeth further from the meane. There bee many sortes of liberalitee, and seldom it can be found in a man that is couetous in keppng his owne, that he is not also coueteous in desiryng of other mens. Ther be that cannot kepe their owne: But in desiryng of other

mennes

mennes thei be insaciat, and go aboute to gette by euery filthye gaynes, as by maintegnyng of baudry, in kepyng of ruffians and hores, vsery, plaie. And suche sort of people sinne greuously in Prodigalitee.

¶ The.xix. Chapiter.

Of magnificence.

MAgnificence is a vertue that wookes in riches, onely in greate expences, & the nature of the Magnificus or noble mã ought to bee diligente, that his wokes be doen with greate honor and greate expences. For he that restraineth and will do his businesse with litle coste: is not Magnific, but rather fearfull

in

in spēdyng. The vertue of magnificēce is vnderstād in great and maruelous thynges, as to make temples & churches wher god is worshipped from whom it is sent & all goodnes cometh. Likewise in makyng great feastes, with costly bankettes and sūpteous lodgyng & great presentes. The magnificus or noble man thynketh not onely vpon his expences, but thynketh more ouer to make other. In magnificēce it nedeth not onely that there bee haboundaunce of thynges, but it nedeth therwith for a manne to ordre and spende thynges where it behoueth, for hymself or mē of his stock. And whosoeuer he bee, that wanteth in these two thinges and vndertaketh, is scorned, if he will take

vpon

vpon hym magnificence, a man that dooth excede in these thynges aboue saíd, is he that expendeth moze then he ought to doo, and he that maie expende litle and expendeth muche, is as he that geueth to iuglars and scokfers & as he that casteth purple in the waie, and dooth not these foz the loue of vertue, but foz to apere glozious to the people.

¶ Nigarde is he that in great thynges goth aboute to spende litle, and marreth the beaute of of his dede foz a litle spendyng, leseth greate coste and greate honoz, and these be the twoo extremites of magnificence. But thei be not to be blamed so that thei hurt not accozdyng to their vice. Magnanimus is he that is redy to do greate deedes, and

is ioious and mery in doyng of them. But he that vndertaketh to do great dedes & is not able, is called vainglorious: And he that is worthy to haue honor & dignitee, & is afraied to receiue thē, is called simple And immagnanimite is extremite by comparisō of thynges, but as to the operaciō it is meane. The very Magnanimite is only in great thynges: ỹis to saie in thynges by the whiche a mā may or doth serue almightie God. And ỹ verie beatitude is in thynkyng of those so hie thynges, so greate & so honorable, ỹ of this thought commeth all goodnesse, after so great aduersities: the whiche cā not be esteined. The mā that is magnanimus is the greteſt mā and moste honorable ỹis, & moueth

ueth not for litle thynges, nor doth not inclyne his magnanimite to any foule thynges. The magnanimite is an ornament & croune of all vertues, and therfore it is no light thyng to fynd the man magnanimus, but it is harde. For he is not onely good to hymselfe, but also to many other. If a mā be Magnanimus he reioyseth not too muche in greate honor doen to hym, & yet so muche honor cannot be doen to answer to his goodnesse and greatnes. And more ouer, ỹ magnanimus reioyseth not muche in prosperitee ỹ cometh to hym, nor troubled for aduersite. Nobilite of bloud riches & antiquite helpeth a mā to be magnanim⁹ And he is very magnanimus ỹ hath in him two thynges by the

whiche he ought to be honored, these be those that be afore said, the surety & goodnesse of a man magnanimus, is as much that he passeth not vpon any perell, for that he doubteth not but to bring his life to good order, and taketh pleasure to do for other, and is ashamed to take of o= ther, because it is a more noble thyng to geue then to receiue. And whē he hath receiued bene= fite he doth study to recōpence: he is slowe in litle expenses, but in great thinges wher it is con= uentēt he is not slow. The man that is Magnanimus loueth other, and if he will euil, it is o= penly and not closely, bicause he thinketh great vileneſſe to hide his will. He is sharpe and she= weth hymself cruell, excepte in thynges

thynges of mirthe: he is conuersaunt with men merely, and hateth flaterars, as bablers and Scoffers, because flaterars bee bondmen and remẽbreth wronges, but he dispiseth theim and careth not, boasteth not hymselfe, nor praiseth other, he passeth more on precious thynges then vpon vile thynges. As a manne that suffiseth to himselfe, when he moueth, he is not in hast, but grauely, and stedfaste in wordes. And this is the diffinicio of the Magnanimus: and he that ouerpasseth these: is called vainglorious, and thei that take vpon theim greate honors as if thei wer worthy, wher thei be not. As in making costly apparell and other greate appearaunce, and thynke there by to

be exalted: I say vnto you, wise men take them for fooles.

Pusillanimus, is he that is worthy to haue greate honors, and is afraied to take theim vpon hym and hides hym from hymself: and this is euill, for euery manne ought to desire honoure and benefite conuenient to hymself. Then euery manne erreth that departeth from the meane: But there bee not many euill in this sorte. In honor is founde meanes and extremities, and in lesse thynges: for in these thynges bee founde more lesse then meane. For a manne maie desire more honoure then he oughte to haue: And suche haue no name but comen, as it is saied before in the cõparison betwene the large and the Magnanimus,

gnanimus, and betwene their extremes. Therefore these bee the greatest thynges and those the leaste, the meane is to bee honored and the extremities to bee blamed.

¶The.xx.Chapiter.

Of Ire and Mekenes.

IN ire is a meane & an extreme, & the extremities haue proper names, and the meane is called Mekenes, and he that kepeth ỹ meane, is called meke, and he that doth habound in ire is called Irefull. And he that is lesse angery then he ought to be is called Iniracible or ireleſſe. And the verie meke if he be angey with whõ, when & wherr, he is called irefull & reported ỹe

that passeth the meane in these thynges, some angry some softe and that is the beste that is in hym. For if all euill thynges should bee together: it should not bee suffered. A man that is not angery where it behoueth, when and with whom and wher is not to bee punished. For he sustaineth vituperacion in that that is not iustly dooen to hym or to his frendes, sometyme we praise suche men that make no great thyng, and sometyme the ireful: saiyng, that thei be strōg menne and hardy. And verely it is a harde thyng to determyne by woordes the circumstance of ire, but so muche wee ought to know, that to kepe the meane is to bee praised, and the extremities is a thyng to be vituperat.

The

The.xxj.Chapiter.

Of the conuersacion of manne.

After we must speke of thynges whiche happen in company and in the conuersacion of menneand in comunicacion, for kepyng the meane in these thynges is to be praised, and the extremities to be blamed. And the meane is, that a man be plesant in speche and conuersacion with folkes: and it behoueth to be cõpanable in thynges conuenient to whom, when, how & wherfore for suche company is nere like vnto frendshyp. There is differẽce in this, that frendshyp hath compassion and humble corage and conuersacion hath not. For why? A man maie cõpany with

men that he knoweth not. And the mā that doth excede in these thynges, is he that medleth him self vncōly to be acquainted w̄ a stranger & with a man that he knoweth not, neighbour or not neighbor without respect: suche one is called a mery felowe, if it bee of nature: But he that maketh mirth for gaines, is called a flatterer, and he that is sad is called rude and vncherfull.

¶ The. xxij. Chapiter.

Of Truthe and liyng.

TRuthe and liynges be the mooste contrarye thinges that can be in the world, and be vsed in worde & in dede. A honorable man and of a good corage vseth truth in worde & deede: and the vile

vile inynded the contrary. The very man is he that kepeth the meane betwene the vaũter that cracketh vpõ himselfe moze then he is, & he that dispzaiseth hym selfe in hidyng the goodnes that is in hym: In lomuche that the verie man affirmeth ỹ goodnes that is in hym nother moze noz lesse, but he that dispzaiseth is of better disposicion, then is he that vaunteth hymselfe: Foz the vaunter lieth in woozde and in dede. Wozsse in these thinges a boue saied, is he that knoweth not hymselfe, and therefoze he is moze vituperable thẽ other, the truthe is to bee pzaised, and lies to bee dispised. Foz the liar speketh such woozdes as he maketh in his mind: a man that is true, foz the loue of truthe, is better

then

then he ẏ is true for profite that he maie haue thereby. He that bosteth and presumeth for gold or siluer, is like vituperable to the vainglorious. But he that vaunteth hymselfe for honor or profit is not so blamable. There bee men that reioyse themselfes in lies, and other lie to be regarded: the humble mā dispraiseth himself to fly strife & busines as did Socrates to haue quiete life. and he ẏ exalteth himself in litle thinges is nothing to be named

¶ The. xxiij. Chapiter.

¶ How a manne is knowen by his mouyng.

THe mā that laugheth to muche is vitupera ble, and he that neuer laugheth thei saie he is

is sad and vncherful. But a mā that is cōpaniable with his felowe & loureth not, nor moueth not other by foule bourdyng & plaiyng, for sometyme iestyng moueth a man to lechery, and is forbiddē in the law, but to kepe good and lotyng compaignie suche a one is to be prayſed.

❧ Shamefastnes is a passion that is ingendred with fere: for why? He that is a shamed changeth colour with euery thyng, & also somtime thei that be afraid Shamfastnes is wit in youth & not vnconuenient to boyes and wenches: for it withdraweth thē frō sinne, but shame is to be blamed in old mē, for age shuld do nothing wherof to be ashamed.

¶ The. xxiiij. Chapiter.

Of Justice.

Justice

Ustice is a commendable habite, by the which a man is made Juste and dooeth the wozkes of Justice, and willeth and loueth thynges that be iust Insomuche as it is the habite of iustice, the whiche is vertue. Then iniustice whiche is the cõtrary, muste needes bee vice: Justice is saied to bee in thzee soztes, and the vniust is also in thzee soztes, he is called vniust that doth against the lawe, and hethat passeth the nature of equalite, and he that meddeleth with vnlawfull and dishoneste gaynes. And likewise a man is Juste in thzee soztes, foz euen so many soztes as is in the one, so many are in the other. So that the iust man is he that doth obserue

serue the law, and the nature of the equalite. and those that bee content with lawfull gaynes.

¶ The.xxv. Chapiter.

¶ Of the Lawe.

THe law is iust, and all thynges of the lawe be iuste, for it commaundeth the workes of vertue: whiche workes make a mã happy, and cõserueth the workes of happinesse in hym, and forbiddeth al euill in cities and countrees, and commaundeth vnto good men greate workes: as to order & araye battailes, and cõmaundeth ỹmen beware of fornication and lechery, and commaundeth that men bee peaceable from hurtyng one another and forbiddeth vnclene speche.

And

And generally it commaundeth the wozkes of iustice, and to flie vice. Justice is the moste noble thing & the most strōgest vertue that is. Wise mē do loue ȳ wozkes of iustice, hauing moze marauel of ȳ goodnes of thē then of ȳ shinyng ster, oz ȳ settyng of the sunne, oz rising therof, foz it is ȳ moste perfight vertue of all other. And the iust man vseth iustice in himself & in his frendes: foz a man ȳ is not good to himself noz to his frēdes, is wozst of al other persōs. Foz a man to be good it sufficeth not onely to be good to hymself, but also to his frendes. Justice is not parte of vertue, but al. And wzōg is not part of vice, but al vice. Therbe kyndes of vices openly fozbidden, as these, adultry, inchātmēt

false

false witnes, treason fraude and deceit. And ther be kindes of vices, which be iniurious, as killing, smityng, & other like thynges, in the which the iust man is somtime equaller, and somtime measurer: in comparison he is called equaller betwene. ii. and a measurer betwene many thynges and fewe, and is in relacion in. iiii. thynges. So the iust mā can be no lesse then in. iiii. thynges. There be two persones betwene whom Justice is to be doen, & .ii. be causes: that is to saie, right and wrōg, and yet in these selfthinges may be equalite: for if ther might be no disequalnes there shold be no equalnes, and so Justice is in proporcion of number. And as iustice is equal so is wrong vniust & vnequall,

and therfore the Lord of the lawes laboreth to bring euery thig equal. Wherfore he killeth one and scourgeth another, & other he sendeth to prisō, vntil the partie haue satisfyed, & so laboreth to bring to muche and to litel in to a meane. Therfore he taketh frō one and geueth to another, til they be egal, and therfore the forme therof is to be knowen, to the intēt that his subiectes may liue stedfastly in the middest.

¶ Yet of Justice,

Chapiter. xxvi.

The inhabitors together in Cities, doo take and geue one to another, and euery one yeldeth toother according to the quantitee of their thinges, and al to come to the middest: for we put the case, that the Smythe hath

hath a thing that is worth one, & the Shomaker hath a thing, that is worth two, the Carpēter hath a thing that is worth thre, thē the Smith must nedes take of the Shomaker his worke: and the Shomaker muste take of the Carpenter his worke, yet the worke of the one, may be better then the other, therfore it is nedeful to some man of equalytee, that maye returne them to a meane: and therfore was found money. For money is a mean by the which a man may bryng euery vnegal into egal, and therby may be taken and geuen greate thinges & litel thinges, & is an instrumēt, wherby iudges may do iustice. Money is a liueleſſe lawe, but the iudge & the lawes haue life. god is ỹ vniuersall law

of al thinges, the vigor & strenthe of egalnes standeth faste by the obseruacion of the law of cities, and the labozers of the fieldes & tilthe likewise increaseth therby, & for lacke of iustice fall in ruine. The prince is the obseruer of iustice and egalnes: and therfore he geueth not the goodes wherof he is Lorde more to himselfe, thē to other. Wherfore it is saide honors and lordships maketh a man knowen. The people presupposeth that liberalite is cause of Principalitee and Lordshippe, and some saye that riches is the cause, other put nobilitee of bloudde. But the wise manne saieth, and beleueth that vertue is the cause, that a manne is worthy to haue Lordshippe. Justice is in two

sortes,

sortes, one is natural, and another accordinge to the lawe: the lawe naturall is one selfe nature in euerye man, as the fyer, wherfocuer it be, it goth vpwarde: the other which is according to the lawe, hath many diuersyties, as we se in sacrifices, which be diuersli done, some by beastes and some by certaine generacyons of trees, and in bothe these iustices, equalite is to be vnderstand. He that rendreth the thing that he hath in keppyng, not willyngly but by feare: is not iuste by himselfe, but by other: but he that yeldeth by himself because of honestye with a good wyll, he is iuste. The hurtes whiche be commonly dooen amonges menne, be in thre sortes. The first by error and by ignorance,

the other is by ignorannce with wil to hurt, the third bi thought malice and in wil to hurte. By ignorance is whē a man in his dede, hathe not studied as other and as he shuld, and these twoo sortes be not imputed vniuste, for why: their dedes procede not of malice, but when a man doth hurt by malice prepenced or by propre will, there is no circumstãce, that can excuse his malice, for it is very euel and vitupera ble. Ther be two maners of ignorances, one natural, as the natural fole, an other wherof a mã is cause, as when a man is ignoraunt, because he wyll not study to knowe the thyng that he oughte to knowe of troth and wel. Aboue iustice is better then iustice, but accordyng to the truth

in

in the very meane, ther is no de uisiõ: and the very iustice is not that whiche is in the lawes, but that iustice whiche is in the Almighty & glorious God, & is geuẽ to mã, bi the which iusticemã maketh himselfe like vnto god.

Of prowesse, Cha, xxvii.

Here bee two kindes of vertues, the one is called morall, the whiche belongeth too the life sencible, whiche hath no reason, another vertue intellectuall or reasonable, the whiche is vnderstandynge and discrecion. Then the life sensyble, doth, fleeth and persecuteth withoute anye delyberacyon: and therfore it is sayed that

this vertue desyreth concupyscence, but the vnderstandyng affirmeth and maketh no election without him, thē the beginning of the election is desyre intellectuall, beecause of some thyng. And no man vseth the election in the thyng that is past before, because that which is doen can not be vndooen: for there vpon is no power, nor there falleth no electiō in thinges of necessite, as in risyng & setting of the Sūne that ryseth by nature.

❧ In the solle of man bee fyue thynges, of the whiche maye be spoken truthe, affirmynge and deniyng, that is to say: Art, scyence, Prudence, Sapience, and vnderstandyng. Scyence is by suche demonstracion which can not be otherwaies, and nether doth

doth ingender nor corrupt, and euery science or discipline that is in vse, so may be taughte. And euery thing that is lerned, must nedes be learned by pryn=ciples, the whiche bee manifeste by them, and the Demonstracy=ons be euer true, and neuer lye. For why? they be of thinges ne=cessary. The disposiciõ of the art is of very reason: the wyse and prudent man can councell hym selfe and other, in thynges that be good and euell, which be ap=perteining vnto men. Thẽ pru=dence is an habite, with the whi che a man may councel with ve=ry reason in thynges towarde men good and euell.

Sapience is an aduaunsing or ioiyng of artificers that hath obtayned scyence. And when it

is said of one that he is wyse in his art, ther is shewed the goodnes and gretnes of his art. The vnderstanding is it that taketh the commandement of thinges, reason science & vnderstandyng be of those thinges that bee naturally noble. There may be found yong men, which be wyse of discipline: but not in prudēce: to be wise in prudence wolde be had a long knowlage in many particuler thinges, the whyche cannot be had but by long time, The adolescente and yong man hath but shoꝛt tyme. Prudence measureth the beginnyng & the end of euery thing, and by & by consenteth to a good councell.

¶ Wilynesse, is of prudence, with the whiche a manne commeth to the entent by great subteltye

teltie of his vnderstandyng, in thinges that bee good, but the subtile is called qualite, in thinges that be euel. As enchantmẽtes, wytchecraftes. Suche are not called wyse, but councelers of stryfe and wilybegylars.

¶ Felicitee is not a thing to be chosen for other, but for himself as helth, the accions of the solle bee accordynge to the measure of Morall vertues, and accordynge to the measure of Prudence and of subtelty, then vertue setteth forthe the right purpose of man, & prudence, that is to say knowlage confirmeth it, and maketh it good and conduceth him vntoiustice. Thes morall vertues make a mã stronge chaste and iust frõ youthe, as in children & some maner of bestes,

then

then these vertues be bi nature; and not by vnderstanding. But the Lordshyp of all vertues belongeth vnto the vertues intellectual, for there can be no electi on without the vnderstandyng, nor cānot be accomplished with out moral vertue, & so pzudence techeth to do that which ought to be done, but moral vertue setteth forth the dede, to fulfill the worke.

Of strengthe.

Chapiter. xxviii.

STrengthe is a laudable habite & good for the man that is very strong sustayneth many terryble thynges, and despyseth deathe, in assailyng those whiche behoueth, and dothe the woorkes of

strengthe,

strength, not to haue honour or delectacion, but onely for vertue. There be men whiche be cõstrained to worke the workes of strength for shame, and to fle reproche, & to get them honor put thẽ selfes in peril of their lyues, rather then to liue with shame.

Wilde strengthe is this that a man dooeth in furor: as when a man is angry for any thing doen against hym, and wold be reuenged. Bestial strength is the fulfillyng of a mans luste burnynglye desyred. Spirituall strengthe is that whyche a man dothe to obtayne honoure and fame. Strengthe Deuyne is that whiche stronge men naturally loue. And Goddes men be very stronge.

¶ Of Chastitee,

Chapiter. xxix.

Chastitee is a temperance in eating and drinckinge and in delectacions, and he that bestoweth himselfe temperatly in thes thinges is to be prayised, and he that excedeth in thes thinges is to be blamed, but fewe and syldome be founde. Chastitee is a fayre thyng, for it delyteth but when, where, & so muche as behoucth, also there is a secular delectaciō which is departed from the mouing of nature, and without cōparison more bituperable then fornicaciō or adultry, that is to say, Masculine with Masculine To be inchast is in diuers sorts for why? it may be in eating and dryn-

drinking & other filthy thiges.

Of Mekenesse,

Chapiter.xxxi.

Mekenesse is an habite to bee praised betwene beynge to fereful and to dull, and so is Malyncoly in lõg perseuerance. Malicious ire demaũdeth great vengeance for lyttel offence. But he that is not sturred for wrong or offence dooen to hym nor to hys kinne, is as a man that hath lost his fealyng.

Of Lyberalitee.

Chapiter.xxxii.

Liberalytee, Magnyfycence, & Manimitee hathe a cõmunite amõgest thẽ selfes, for whyche they

they be al in receauyng and geuyng moneye: where when and how muche it behoueth. And it is a moze fearful thing to geue then to receaue, and ſuche men flee from filthy gaynes, and the couetous man is a greate deſpyter, and therfoze the lyberal poſſeſſeth not ſo muche as doth the couetous.

¶ Of Magnanimitee.

Chappter.xxxiii

The Magnanimus doth deſerue gret honozs, & pzaiſes, and is euermoze redye to ſet his mind vpon great thinges, and deſpyſeth the littel and vile thynges, but he that expendeth where he ſhould not, is called Pzodigal. Enuious is he that is ſozy foz the

tes, one sorte is in deuidyng of money, offices, and honors. The other in helyng the hurtes that one man taketh of an other, for men haue bulinesse together in twoo sortes, the one is by will, that is to saie, when the beginnyng of the deede is in our arbitre. And out of the wil is this when a man hath to do with an other, and will doo it by force or gyle, as rapine, stelth and other like thynges.

¶ The. xxiiij. Chapiter.

¶ Of Justice:

THe factor of ỹ lawes, are the equals, which are the cõtraries ỹ be betwen to muche and to litle. The equall iudge deuideth mony & honor, & maketh de-

uision betwene two at the leaſt. Juſtice partes betwene foure thynges, the whiche thynges haue proporciō from the firſt to the ſeconde, and from the thirde to the fourth, and the equalnes of theim is accordyng to the propoꝛcion ſelfe: And Juſtice iudgeth emongeſt theim accoꝛdyng to the qualitee of the vertue, and of the merite. The maker whole that healeth the factiō of the deedes that bee dooen betwene menne, is he that maketh the lawes: For he decerneth and doth iuſtice betwene theim that dooe wrong and theim that take it, and rendereth inheritance to thē that haue right thereto, and taketh frō theim that poſſeſſeth wrongfully. Some cōdemne in perſone and ſome in their goo-

des

the prosperite bothe of the good and euill, without any differēce Contrary to hym is he that reioiseth in the prosperite of them that bee good & euill, the meane betwene theim is he that ioyeth in the prosperitee of theim that be good, and sorroweth for the euil, he that is a shamed of euery thyng is called shamefaste: He that crackes vpon hymself and dispiseth other menne is called a proude vaunter.

¶ The. xxxiij. Chapiter.

¶ Of compaignie.

THere bee men with whom it is painefull to liue, because thei of their nature bee not tractable. Ther be other that be flatterers

of euery body: and ther be other that kepe a meane, and those be thei that vse thēselfes, as where when, with whom, & how muche and suche maner of men bee verely to be praised. Scoffers bee those whiche compaignieth emongest folkes with laughyng bourding & gestyng vpon them selfes, their wifes and children, and not onely vpon theim, but also vpon other men. Contrary to hym is he that loketh euermore as he were troubled, lowryng, and is neuer mery emongest folkes, nor cannot be with theim that be mery. And he that kepeth the meane emongest suche, is he that vseth mesure The iust man is he that is called Equall or Equaller, and the iuste equalleth thynges in twoo sortes

des, and some maketh equal the litle with the much, bicause he ȳ receiueth the iniury is lessoned by hym that dooth it, the iudge is equallar betwene them accoꝛding to the mesure of Artismethique. Therfoꝛe mē go to ȳ iudge bicause the iudge is saied to bee in similitude the like of Justice, bicause he oꝛdereth iustice accoꝛdyng moderately as it is possible, and iustices is not in euery place in suche soꝛte, that to hym that doeth, be doen somuche as he hath doen: and that frō hym that did take, bee taken somuche as he hath taken. Foꝛ why? The moderate equalnesse standeth not euermoꝛe in this, and as the iuste man is contrary to hym that is not Juste, so the equall is cōtrary to the vnequal

and the meane is somtime more cõtrary to the one extreme, then it is to the other: and the one extreme is more contrary to the other, thẽ it is to the meane. The Justice of cities is a meane, betwene lesyng and gettyng: and cannot be doen without taking and geuyngchange. As he that weiueth clothe for other thynges that he nedeth. The smithe geueth Iron for other thynges that he nedeth, and therefore in these changes was greate strife so was founde the thyng that might equall all thynges together: This that is more worthe with that that is worthe lesse, and this thing was money, whiche maketh equall the worke of the Carpenter with the woorke of the shomaker. Aboue iustice

is

is more then Justice. Then the mā that is better then the good man, is good in al sortes ỹ maie bee. And he that is more Juste then he that is iust, is iust in all sortes that maie bee. Naturall iustice is better thē iustice that is compounded by man, as the hony that is swete by nature, is better then the like hony that is made by crafte.

❧ The iust mā liueth by life of life, that is to saie, the great delectacion ỹ he hath to iustice naturall. It for it self, belongeth and vseth the iust thing, lokyng not to the punisher of the lawes to put it generally in al generacions, for bicause it is vnpossible that the generall rules be folowed and kepte in all these thynges, the whiche bee not vniuer-

sal. Then the wordes of the law ought to be perticulars, bicause thei iudgē of thynges corporal.

¶ The.xxxv. Chapiter.

¶ Of Vice.

Here be thre maner of vices that bee very euill, from the whiche euery mãne ought to flie, that is to saie: Malice Cruelte and Lechery. And yet there bee to these three contrary vertues, that is to saie: Benignitee Pitie and Chastitee. There bee some men whiche be of a deuine nature, by the aboundaunce of the vertues that be in them, and suche an habite is all contrary to Cruelte, and suche menne be Angelike deuine, and the vertues of them bee aboue the vertues of other men. Like as the

vertues

vertues of God be aboue al the vertues of mē, so there be other men cruell in their maners and be of wilde nature: and suche be far of from vertue. There be other men that bee of the nature of beastes, in folowyng of their desires and their delectacions, and those bee in similitude like vnto Apes and to hogges, and those men that folowe their willes bee called Epicures, that is to saie: men that thynke not but of their bodies. Men that bee called deuine and menne that bee wilde of custome: there bee but fewe in the worlde, and specially wilde men, yet there be found in thextreme regiōs, in the whiche thei dwell, ỹ is in the southe partes where as thei fynde slaues, it is saied of the deuine mā

that he is chast and continent, for that he abstaineth hymselfe from euill concupiscence, according to the power of the vertue intellectuall.

¶ Manne hath his limittes vnto the whiche he moueth naturally, wherein he walketh as in the meane, excepte his nature inclineth too the nature of beastes, whiche if thei bee loosed, folowe the mouyng of their owne desires in runnyng thorowe pastures, not abstaynyng theym selues from any thyng that their nature leadeth theim vnto. And in this wise a manne goeth from his termes and limettes, & suche a man is worsse then a beast, by the euil life that he choseth, bycause the science of manne is truthe. But that man

man that learneth science accordyng to the nature of Morall vertue and vertue deuine & intellectuall, remaigneth within his bōdes and, vseth vniuersall proposicions which conducteth hym vnto true knoweledge.

¶The.xxxvj.Chapiter.

Of Delight.

THere bee delectable thynges whyche bee delectable by necessitee, and there bee thynges delectable by eleccion. And of those, there be that are to be chosen for our selfes, & also of those that are to be chosē for fauor of other. The necessari delectaciōs that a man hath, be in eating, in drinkyng and in lechery, and in

all

all other corporall delectacion, there where is no measure, those which a man choseth or electeth for hymself, bee these, that is to saie, certētye of knowledge and deuine reason. Elecciōs whiche bee electe for fauor one of another bee these, victory, honor, riches and al other thynges good in the whiche beastes is comen with vs: Who that kepeth the meane in these thynges is to be praised, and who that wāteth in these thynges is to be blamed.

¶ There bee naturall delectacions and beastly delectacions. Also ther be wilde delectacions and ther be delectacions by occasion of tyme, & there bee other delectacions by occasion of infirmitie, and other that come by vse, and other by euill nature.

Wildishe

Wildish delectacion is in them that make women with child to bee opened, bicause thei will se how the childe dooth lie in their bodies: And as thei that eateth mannes flesshe and rawe flesshe. Delectacions of infirmitie, or by euil vse, is of pickyng ỹ browes paryng nailes, eatyng of coles, and other trifles. Delectacio by euill nature is to lye one Masculyne with another, and all other vituperable thynges of lechery. Ther be some malicious and wild maners, as be in them that bee vnbrideled, madde, and Melancolly, and like vnto thē, the furious man thynketh that all that pleseth hym is against all other men. If he haue a litle cause to bee angree runneth in as a folishe seruaunte to dooe a

thyng

thyng before he bee cõmaunded and doth as a dogge ỹ barketh bothe at frendes and enemies. And this incontinence which is in Ire cometh of a light mynde and by violẽce of mouyng. And therfore he is more to be pardoned then he that incontinent followeth his cõcupiscence. For as sone as he seth the thyng that delighteth hym, he tarieth not the iudgemẽte of reason, but rather searcheth for the thyng that he desireth. Then the incontinence of Ire is more naturall then is thincontinence of concupiscence and demaundeth darke places. And therefore it is saied of concupiscẽce that she ouerthroweth her sonne. The man that dooth euil and repenteth hym not, can not be correct: but the man that

doth

doth euill and repēteth, there is hope. Thei that haue no vnder-stādyng be better then thei that haue it, & bestowe it not. Ther-foze thei that let themself to bee ouercome with cōcupiscence by delight of vnderstandyng, bee like vnto them that be dzonken with litle wyne, by febleneſſe of the bzayne. The continent man that hath vnderstandyng, affir-meth hymself and continueth in very reason and holsome elec-ciō, and departeth not from the right moderacion. It is a moze lighte thyng to moue custome then nature, yet a hard thyng it is to bzeke custome, foz custome is like nature. There be men to whom it semeth no delectacion to bee good, nether to hymself noz yet to other. And there be o-

ther

ther to whō it semeth that some delectacions be good and some euill, & to some it semeth that al maner of delectacions be good: Delectacions without respecte is not good. For why? It is of sensualite: then it is not like vn to thynges complet. The chaste man flieth delectacions bicause thei make vnderstandyng dronken and maketh man to forget godnesse. Childzen and beastes demaunde delectacions. There bee some delectaciōs that make a man seke and bryng trouble, then a man that is of good vnderstandyng, demaundeth the plealures of the body but moderately.

¶ The.xxxviij. Chapiter.

¶ Of Chastitee.

Chastitee

Chastite and continẽce, ar not al one thing: for Chastitie is an habite, the whiche is fixed in the mind of man by longe time, hauing ouercome the desires of the flesh, so that it fealeth no assaultes of temptacions: but cõtinẽce is an habite by the which a man sustaineth harde temptacions, muche molested: But neuertheleſſe consenteth not therto, so muche reason is in hym. Then Chastitee and continence are not all one. The inchast is an habite by the which a mã sinneth in delectable thinges, without great instance of temptacyons, as a man not constrayned and goeth searchyng delectacyons. Then the incontinent is he

that is ouercome with temptā-
cions, whiche prycke him strōg-
ly. But the vnchaste man is he
that letteth him selfe to be ouer-
come with tēptacions that pric-
keth hym not. And the incontti-
nence is suche by debilite of rea-
son, and by littell truste. Then
there is no meane at al, but stā-
deth as an euill mean, & may be
correct, yf vertue & hope lie to-
gether. But the inchaste can ne-
uer be correcte, for vertue hathe
noo power in malice to muche
bled. For the reason ofte tymes
corrupteth by two muche con-
cuppyscence: And the acte of the
malicious is knowen, for ver
tue is whole in reason, but
in malice, reason
is corrupte.

Of

¶ Of Constancie.

Chapiter. xxxviii.

Here be three maners of stablenes, one is that a man be stable in al hys woorkes trewe or falce, whatsoeuer they be. The second is contrary to this. The third is a man that wyll stande in the thing that is good, and lightely depart from a thing that is euell. But generally the man that is constante, is better then the manne that is mutable, for the mutable moueth with euerye winde, but the constante mouethe not for anye stronge desire, but somtime by his noble delectacion mouethe frome his falce credence, and consenteth to the trewthe. It

is impossible that a man be wise and incontinent to geather. For prudence is but onelye in the worke, ofte tymes incontinence and wylynes be together: and so subteltie is deuided from prudence: And prudence is in those thiges which be good: But subteltee is both in the good and in the euil. And the wise man that worketh not accordingto his science, is lyke to hym that slepeth and is droncke. The lighte and wantō man is the pit of carnal desyres, afflict and swalowed in the workes of reason, and is as a dronckard which hath bound his wit and is smothered in his brayne by the vapours of wyne for to much wine peruerteth the ryght iudgement. The frendful man is he that wronges other

by

by councell prepensed, and by Ire maketh election without reason, which is euel withoute remedy.

¶ Of Amitee. cha. xxxix.

AMitee is one of the vertues of almightie God and of mā, and is much nedeful to the life of mā, and a man hath nede of frēdship in this life as of other thynges. And the mighty riche princes of the earth haue nede of frendes, to whom thei may be beneficial and of whom they may receaue thankes, honors and seruices. A gret suretie it is to a mā to haue frendes, for so much as a man is in the degre of gretnes, the more egal he is to fal, and his fal most

perillous. Then frendes are mooste nedefull in the tyme of stryfe and aduersitee. And therfore it is a good and a sure refuge. For a manne that hath no frende, is alone in his dedes: And when he is with his frend, he hathe companye and helpe to bringe his worke to passe. For why: of two perfytte personnes commeth perfite worke and vnderstandyng. The makers of the lawe put their Citezens in comfort to haue Charitee together with Justice. For why: yf euery man were iuste, yet Charitee should be nedefull. But yf euery man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not nede: for where frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and euery discorde that may be.

¶ Of

¶ Of the kindes of Amitee. Chapiter. xl.

THE kyndes of Amitee bee knowen by the thiges that a man loueth, whiche be thre, that is to saie: Good, Profytable, and delectable. And he that is suche one accordyng to the truthe, loueth hym that is like hym. The kindes of amite ben thre, the one is loued for good, another for gaines, and the other for delectaciõs, and to euery one it is nedefull to manifest tribulaciõ. For they that loue, bereth good will commonly one to another, and verely loue the thinges by the which they be frendes, that is to say, delectacion & profit: whence the amitee indureth so longe as

indureth the delectacio and the perfite, and therfore they be frē-
des and enemies. The frēdshyp is in olde folkes, but the frend-
ship of delectacion is amongest them that be yonge, howbeit the perfite Amite is in them that be good, and that be like in vertue, and beare good wil one to ano-
ther, because they be like in their vertues. And this frendshyp is a way that conteyneth al good-
nes, and amongest themthere is no delectacio nor euil. And ther-
fore this frendship cannot be be twene the good man & the euell. but onely amongest theim that be good. But the amitee that is by delectacion or for pfit may be amongest good & euel, howbe it it contyneweth not longe. A-
mite is a laudable adornement

to

to them that company together and is a kayze lyke, by the which they liue together in tranquillitee: and the tranquillitee that is amongest them, doth not depart by the diuersitee of places, and shoulde not stande yf they were farre of, this maye bee a departyng & goyng out of the mynd-fulfrendshyp, and therfoze it is a pzouerbe, that long viages depart frendshippe. A welbeloued thynge hathe some noble goodnes, and therefoze frendes loue together, & not because of fode oz repaste, but because of habit, and euery frend loueth his welthe, and rendereth one to another accozdynge to equalitee.

Howe that the substance of the good shuld be cõmen.

Chapiter. xli.

The participacion of theim that be parteners together in good and euell, in marchandise and in conuersacion together, is euer a beginning of frēdship, and accoyding to the quantitee of the thynges, soo is the quantitee of frendshyppe, and they that haue frendes oughte to common amongest them. For amitee is a thing of commente, and euery commontie desyreth lyke concupiscence. And therefore is made the solempnitee of Pasch, oblacions and offerynges, so that of thes thinges mai growe company and loue amōgest neighboures, of the whiche thing

thing procedeth honour and exaltacion of almighty God. And in olde tyme they kept their solempnitees after Corne Haruest, because at that time menne were moost able to helpe their frendes, and to geue thankes to God for his benefites receiued.

Of principalitees.

Chapiter. xlii.

There be thre principalitees, the fyrste of the kyng, another of the Commonalte, and the thirde of the Father vppon his childzen, and echone of these hathe his contrary. For the king inforceth his subiectes to goodnes, and is studious to procure theyr good estate, as the Herdemanne is studyous vppon his flocke. It is a differēce betwene the

the Lordshippe of the king and other in this : For the kinge is Lorde vniuersall of the people, the father is the cause of the generacyon of hys chyldren and of the bryngyng vp of theym. Then the father is natural lord of his chyldren, and their loue is greate. Therefore the father oughte to be honoured with the honoure dewe vnto hym. The Justice of euerye manne is accordyng to the quantitee of his vertue, then whosoeuer is greateste, oughte to bee mooste loued and honoured. The loue of brothers is as the loue of fellowes, because they come togither and hathe one symylitude when there commeth aduersytee.

❧ The Lorde and the subiecte haue one Relygyon togyther.

Lyke

Lyke as the craftes manne and his instrumente, and as the bodye and the solle. And he that vseth the Instrucmente profyteth thereby, and therfore he loueth it, but the Instrument loueth not hym that weare the it. ❧ And lykewyse the bodye loueth not the solle: The Instrument is as the bonde man whyche loueth not his Lorde. The father loueth the sonne, and the sonne the father, because the one is made of the other: but the loue of the father is more stronger than the loue of the sonne, & the reason is: for that the father knoweth his sonne to be of hym in shorte tyme after his byrthe: But the sonne knoweth not the father of longe after, that is when his wittes be come to him

and

and discression cõforteth. Moze ouer, the father loueth the sõne as hymselfe. But the sõne loueth the father as a thyng made of him. Bzothers loue together as beeyng of one beginnyng. For thei be one thing: although thei be departed. And this that conforteth loue emonges bzethern is that thei bee nouriſhed and bzought vp together.

¶ The. xliij. Chapter

¶ The loue that a man hath with GOD.

THe loue that aman hath with god, and the loue that a mã hath to his father, is of one nature. For why? Eche one of their loues is by a recordaciõ of grace.

But

But the loue of God oughte to bee preferred before the loue of the father. For ẏ benefites that a mā receiueth of God: be more greate and more noble then thei whiche be receiued of the father The amite of kyndred, frendes, neighbours and straungers, is more and lesse accordyng to the diuersite of the causes, by ẏ whiche one beareth good will vnto another. Therefore thei that be brought vp together, beeyng of long tyme conuersant together be of great frendship. The loue that is betwene a man and his wife is loue naturall, & a more aunciēt loue then is ẏ loue of citezēs emongest thē, and in this loue is great profite. For why? the workes of the mā is diuerse from the workes of the woman.

And

And that whyche the one canne not dooe, the other dothe, and so they fulfyll theyr busynesse: The chyldren be bondes whiche bynde the woman to the husbande in loue, because the chyldren bee the common wealth of them bothe.

How that loue is increased by cõmunication of frendes

Chapyter. xliiii.

Ommunicatiõ ioyneth theym that be good togyther in one loue, by occacion of vertues: whyche verily be louing together in theym selues, for there is not amongest them any strife or contencion, nor will to haue victory the one of the other: but only

to

to serue and please, for why: It is a great pleasure when a man hath dooen seruice to his frendes. There bee frendships whiche be called questionalles, and those frendshippes bee in men whiche receiue one of another, wherof commeth greate accusacions, as when the one saieth: I haue dooen thee pleasure, and thou hast doen me none: Suche frendship cannot long indure.

Amitee is like vnto Justice and accordyng to iustice in two sortes, that is to saie: Naturall and legall. So is frendship in two sortes, naturall and legall: And the legall is called amitee, and the perticular is a market of change, as she that standeth in geuyng and receiuyng naturally frō hand to hande. There

are diuerse men that be pleased with that thyng whiche is well and conuenient, but notwithstā dyng thei leaue the good & take the profitable. A good thyng it is to do good to other without any hope of gaynes. But pro-fitable is when a manne thyn-keth to haue a greater power. This seruice is it that a manne dooth to hym that is mightie and able to geue rewardes and chaunge for seruice dooen.

¶ The. xlv. Chapiter.

Of the loue that ought to bee emongest mienne.

LOue is the pryce of vertue and thankes of benefites receiued Gaynes or wynnyng is seuerally of nede, & the grea-

ter

ter man ought to geue vnto the
lesse winnyng, & the lesse ought
to geue vnto the greater honor
and reuerence. And this ought
to bee accordyng to the deser-
uyng of theim bothe: In these
waies is conserued frendeship.
The honor that a manne ought
to doo to almightie God and to
his father, is not like other ho-
nors; for no man can geue suffi-
ciente honores and thankes to
God & to his father. Although
he inforce himself to do what he
can, the commendable equalnes
is to equall the kindes of amite
that bee diuerse, as it is in the
orderyng of citees, that the sho-
maker selleth his shooes as he
will, and likewise other craftes
men emongest them. One thing
is loued by the whiche all mar-

chaundise bee made equall and confirmed, this is Gold and siluer. When the louer loueth his loue for delectacion, & she loueth him for profite, thei loue not the one the other right wel, therfore suche loue is sone loste. Euery loue ỹ is for light thinges doth shortly departe. But the reasõs that be strong and stedfast causeth frendship, and loue to continue that is by vertue, for the good is long laster. For whye Vertue cannot be remoued but profite departeth when profitable is taken awaie. A man that syngeth for gaynes, if a manne should syng one song for another, he would not be cõtent, because he loketh for another reward. Then there shalbe no concord in marchandise, if there be

not

not concord of willes, and that is whē a man receiueth for that that he geueth, that he would haue. And sometymes it is for that for ꝑ whiche he geueth nothing but honor & reuerence, as did Pithagoras the which would haue nothyng of hys Scholers for his doctryne but honoure and reuerence. And somtime for doctryne a man will haue mony, as the Mechaniques, but it is not so in Philosophie, for he that teacheth other knowledge, ought to receiue of his disciple honor and subiection, as a lord and father. It is nedefull for a manne to knowe the dignitie of men. So that euery man maie geue honoure accordyng to his dutie. For a man oweth one honor to his father, another to the

people, another to the Lorde of the hoste, another to the felowe, another to the neighbor, and another to the strãger. He that vseth fraude in frẽdship, is worse thẽ he that vseth fraude in gold and siluer, euẽ somuche as frenship is more precious then gold and siluer, so muche the wourse is he that fraudeth amitie, then he that deceiueth in Golde and siluer. And like as false money is shortly broken, so false frenship shortely departeth.

¶The.xlvj.Chapiter.

¶How almightie God departeth all goodnesse.

THE equall parte of goodnes is almighty God, whiche geueth too euery one accor-

dyng

dyng as their nature is apte to receiue. The man that is good delighteth in hymselfe, hauyng ioye of the good woorkes, and if he bee good reioyseth hym muche with his frende, whiche he taketh as himselfe. But the euill manne flieth from the good and noble operacions, and if he be very euill he flieth from hymselfe. For when he standeth alone he is rebuked in hymselfe, in remembryng the euill woorkes whiche he hath dooen, and neither loueth hymselfe nor other, because the nature of goodnesse is mortified in hym in the depenesse of iniquite, ne delighteth not fully in ỹ euill that he doth. For the nature of goodnes drawe-th vnto delectacion and deuydeth in hymselfe. And therfore he

is in perpetuall trouble & paines full of bitternesse and dronken in filthinesse and of diuersitee. Then to suche a man no man cā bee afrende: For a frende ought to haue in hym a thyng to be loued, and suche one hath in hym self so muche misery that there is no remedy, that he may come to felicite. Then let no man fall in to this pitte of Iniquite, but rather enforce hym to come to goodnes, by the whiche he maie haue delectacio and ioye in him self. Comforte is not frendship although it bee like vnto it. The beginnyng of frendship is pleasure had in tymes past. As the loue of a woman of the whiche a manne hath had pleasure and delectacion, and is a bonde of loue and foloweth it inseperable

table, the desperaciō of the whiche procedeth. Comforte maie bee frendship by similitude, till it bee growē by custome of time and the office of comfort apperteigneth vnto hym that hath in hym grace and grauite, and excercised in vertue knitte of loue and concorde: for discorde in opinions is to bee drawen oute of a noble congregacion, so that it maie remaigne in vnitee and peace and in concord of willes. Those thynges that geue other verite and dignitee to rule bee vertuous & their woorkes. And the vnite of opinions be found in good menne, bycause thei bee firme and stable emōgest theim self in outwarde thynges, for thei beare good will continually: but seldome men agre in one

opinion. And to fulfill their desires thei sustaine greate strife and muche busines̄e, but not because of vertue. And bee solicitous to deceiue them with whō thei haue to doo, and euer be in strief and in contencio. The benefactors loue their beneficiates more then thei bee loued of them. For the benefactor loueth with pure liberalite, but the beneficiates louen their benefactors by debte of thankes. And moreouer the benefactor loueth the beneficiate as creditor: But the beneficiate loueth as a debtor, ỹ creditor reioyseth against his debitor. The debitor is troubled bicause he feareth his debitor: then the beneficiates faine to loue their benefactours bycause thei would not bee rebu-

ked

ked of vnkindnesse. And yet the receite of the benefite is factor: and in speciall if he haue mynd. For why: The vttermoste perfecciō of man is in his operaciō

¶ The. xlviij. Chapiter.

¶ How man delighteth hym in many thynges.

Wanne delighteth in three thynges, that is to say: in thynges present in vsyng of them: In thynges past in remēbryng of them, and in thinges to come in trustyng of them. The wookes good and noble continewe long and be delectable to remēbrance. But the delectable and profitable satisfie but litle, and the memory shortly past. Euery manne loueth more the thinges

that

that he getteth with paine, then the thyng that he getteth without pain, as it is of money: whiche whē it is gotten with great labor, it is kept with great studie and moderatly spente. And who ỳ getteth it without labor spendeth it without moderaciō. And this is the cause wherefore the mother loueth ỳ childe more then dooth the father. For why? She suffreth great trauail and anguishe in the birthe. Now in somuche that it is a light thyng to receiue benefites, and a hard thyng to geue theim, the benefactor loueth better his benefactor, then the benificiator loueth his benefactor. There bee men that loue themself to much, and that is called a filthy loue. The euill man doth euery thyng vpon

pon will, but the good and ver-
teons manne dooth the wozkes
whiche bee good and verteous,
foz the loue of vertue and good
nes. And there bee other menne
that by ỹ nobilitee of their min-
des, be good to their frendes, in
leuyng them their goodes. So
that their wozkes maie remain
in perpetuall memozye . My
frend is another. This is a pzo
uerbe. By a pzouerbe it is saied
Frendes haue one life and one
bloud, and all their thynges be
bee equally comen: as the nose
to the face, the knee to the legge
and the fynger to the hande. A
manne ought to loue his frend,
foz in louing him he loueth him
self, and should not be loued foz
honoz oz cozpozall delectacion,
but rather foz the very loue of
vertue.

vertue. And the manne that loueth his frend in this sorte, is a very frende, he helpeth and supporteth with body and goodes, and with his life if nede be. The full felicitee of mankynde is in the obteignyng of frendes, for no man would haue al the goodes of the worlde to liue alone. Then a man hath nede of frendes, to whom he maie bee beneficiall, and with whom he maie comenly vse felicite. It is a natural thyng to man to liue citezenly, and a necessary thyng to a manne to accomplishe his busines of necessitee by his neighbores and frendes, whiche cannot bee doen by hymself. To do well it is a noble and delectable thyng: and the vertues electe in good deedes bee fewe. But the profitable

profitable & delectable be many
The frendes of pleasure should
not bee many, for thei be but for
disgestion of meate. There can
bee but one verteous frend. As
a man can haue but one louer
that he loueth intierly. For whi:
That loue is of aboundaunce,
the whiche is but to one alone.
But counsaill honest and con=
ueniente, ought to bee to euery
man by dutie of vertue. A man
hath nede of frendes in tyme of
aduersitee and prosperitee to be
comen with hym in his goodes:
and liuyng in ioye and plesure,
so that menne maie become the
better one by another. And in
aduersitee, so that a man maie
haue helpe and counsaill of his
frende.

The

¶ The.xlviij. Chapiter.

¶ How Delectacion is naturall.

Delectacio is borne and norished with vs from the beginnyng of oure nature, therfore children should bee taughte at the beginnyng, to delight themselfes in thynges conuenient, and likewise against that to mislike the contraries. And this is the foundacions of vertue morall, and in processe growethe and is knowen the beatitude of the life. For when a manne delighteth in a thyng, it is his choyse, and when it greueth, he flieth it. And there bee menne whiche be seruauntes to the delectacions, wherfore

wherfore their delectacions bee destroyed against God of this that thei owe. Those mē whiche claime delectacions and folowe them saie against their mindes, and saie not euill of theim concerning the vertue. For the true woorde dooth euer helpe and amendeth the maners of the life better: but the operacion woorketh more then doth the worde. And therefore the good man informeth his life with good woordes & good woorkes. The thyng that is desired for it self is beste and the griefe is euil. For why? It is contrary to delectacion, & also euery thyng that is good helpeth vnto another thyng to make it good. And delectacion helpeth other thynges and maketh theim better. Then she is

good Plato saieth. That delec-
tacion was not good, & parad-
uenture he saith not truth. For
why? In euery thyng is natu-
rally some thyng that is good,
then in delectaciō is some thing
that is good. It is a thyng vn-
possible that one good thyng be
contrary to the other. And it is
impossible that one euill be not
contrary to another, and bothe
two are to be fled: But two goo
des are not contrary to gether,
but rather be like, and both two
are to bee electe and chosen, but
yet the one maie bee better then
the other: As one man maie bee
more wise then the other & more
iust. Delectaciō is not mouing,
for euery thyng that may moue
hath tariyng and hastyng. But
thynges relatiue haue no mo-
uyng

uyng by themselfes, then delectacion is not mouyng.

The. xlix. Chapiter.

Of Delectacion sensible and intellectuall.

Delectacio is ether sēcible or intellectuall and there whet is the felyng, there is the delectacion, then it must nedes be that this delectacion bee in the sencible life. And there where is the vnderstandyng is the operacio sencible. Then it is of necessitec that these delectacions bee in the mynde intellectuall. And many tymes before the delectacions of the senses is griefe. As before delectacion of eatyng manne hath honger. And before delectacion of drinkyng a

man hath first, but before the delectaciō of hering, seing, or smellyng: ther is no griefe. And like as in al thynges of delectacions intellectuall, delectable thynges be had in men whiche haue peruerse nature, and bee not to be called delectables, according to the truth. As thynges that apere bitter to the sicke and are not bitter accordyng to ẏ truth. So of euery operacion: for as the iuste man delighteth in iustice, so the wise man delighteth in the workes of Sapience. Euery man is pleased with the operacions in the whiche he delighteth, and the delectaciō maketh the woorkes perfight. Delectacion is a complete fourme whiche hath no neede to her accōplishyng, nether of tyme nor

of

of mouyng. That is to say: ther is no mouyng accordyng to her forme in the tyme, but fulfilleth her self out of tyme, as if there were no mouyng circuler. The sencible delectaciō is accordyng to the quantitee of the felyng, and in the thyng that is felte, and in the operaciō betwene the one and the other. Then when the senses bee strong: the thynges bee more delectable, when the strengthe of delectacton is geuen to delighte. Because the goodnesse of the worke is in the strength of the thyng that doth and is the beginnyng of the thyng that it suffereth.

¶ The.l. Chapiter.

The moste delectable delectacion.

THe moste delectable delectacions be thoſe whiche be moſte complete & moſte perfite. And thoſe whiche fulfill all the delectaciõs of man. And ſo lõg indureth the delectaciõs as the vertue of the thynges indureth by the whiche a man delighteth hym as youth when it hath the thing that pleſeth. And therfore the delectacions cannot ſuffice: till thei become leſſe, as it commeth to age. When the vertue miniſheth, the man that deſireth life deſireth delectacion, for delectacion is complete of the life The delectaciõ intelligible differeth from the ſẽcible, and euery delectacion multiplieth and increaſeth her wooꝛkes, and by this is multiplied Artes & ſcience

ences, because mā delighteth in them. There be delectacions of operacions, whiche sometyme letteth other delectacions or operacions. As a manne that delighteth in Harpyng, soinuche that he forgetteth other workes that he hath in handc. Delectacions that bee in noble operacions: bee noble and are to be followed. And the vile is vile and not to be folowed. Those delectacions be diuerse in kind: whiche bee diuerse in operacion, in kynde as delectacions intellectuall and sensible. And these be of diuerse kyndes whiche bee likewyse diuerse in operacions as of the sight and felyng. Euery beast hath his delectacion in the whiche he delighteth: but of all other delectacions the intel-

lectual is moste delectable, and moste noble emongest all other delectacõs. As the gold emongest all other metalles, accoꝛdyng to ỹ diuerlities of men, by diuerse delectations. But those bee very good that apere good to theim that bee good, and not to the vicious, as a thyng that is swete and bitter to the whole man and not the sicke.

¶ The. ij. Chapiter.

¶ How that beatitude is the fulnes of vertue.

Sith ỹ we haue spoke of vertue and delight it therefoꝛe behoueth vs to speke of felicite and beatitude, whiche be thacõplesshyng of all the goodnesse of mã. This felicite is not habite,

but

but rather Acte, to the whiche a man intendeth to cōmen by him selfe or by other. Beatitude is a thing out of it self, the man that hath not tasted the swetenesse of Beatitude in the whiche is the delight of the vnderstādyng of man: hath his refuge to the plesures of the body, in the whiche he hath put his truste. And thei be not of a truth to be called delectacions. Beatitude is not to bee chosen by boyes, but verely in this that semeth to be delectable to thē that be good men. Felicite is not in spoxte and plaie, but rather in thynges had by labor and studye. It is a manifest thyng of blessednes, when a mā laboreth with vertue in ordinat thynges & in thynges of solace. And therfore it is saied: that the

vnderstandyng is a moze noble thyng then is ỹnole, foz because the moste noble mẽbze doth the moste noble operacion, and the best mãwozketh the best wozke, by ỹ whiche it is a wozthy thing that felicite be operacion of the most noble vertue whiche is naturalli purposed to al thinges ỹ bee geuen of God to man. And felicitee is no nother thyng but be stedfast in vertue & in her to wozkes. The moste perfight delectacions that be, are in thacte of felicite, and meruelous delectacions be found in philosophy by the truth & by certẽty that is foũd in ỹ lawes. And a moze sauerous delectacion is this, that a man hath whẽ he knoweth the thyng, then when he thinketh to knowe. Then the operacion of

this

this vertue is vppermost & supreme felicite. The wise manne hath nede of thinges ẏ be necessary to ẏ life as other hath. For vertue is busied in outwarde thynges: as in Justice, Chastite and strength, and in other ordinate operacions: because ẏ matter of operaciō is outward, but the operacion of sapience is inwarde, as to the necessitee. But neuertheles if a man haue help he woorketh more perfightly in his thought. Then this felicite is no nother but hope to knowe And of thought, felicite represēteth battail because of health & of peace, and this apereth manifestly in ẏ citees whiche make war to haue rest and peace, and like so to all other vertues of battail. For euery manne intendeth

deth some outwarde thynges, but the vnderstanding speculatiue is euer in peace and in trãquilite. But it hath nede of lõg tyme. For it is not semyng or cõuenient to felicitee, to haue any thyng imperfecte. And when a man cometh to this degre of felicite, he liueth not by the life of man, but liueth by that deuine thyng whiche is in man. Then the life that aperteineth to this acte is deuine life. But the life that aperteineth to ỹ actes of other vertues, is humain. Therfore it is not cõueniẽt to a good man that his diligence bee humain, nor his desire bee not morall, although it so apere. But yet is bounden to inforce hymselfe to bee morall accordyng to his power. And yet euer to in-

force

force himself to liue by the most noblest life that is in hym. For although a man bee but litle of persone, he is aboue all other creatures. whence the moste delectable life that a man hath is by vnderstandyng.

¶ The.lij. Chapiter.

¶ Of the morall vertue and of the happie manne.

THese vertues morall or Ciuill will, bee in more trouble & more solicite then the intellectualles, for that liberalitee hath neede of riches. The iuste man is busied with theim that commaũde iustice, and likewise of the straunge man and chaste, but these vertues intellectuall haue no nede, for the accomplishyng

shyng of their operacios of out ward thynges. But rather many tymes the very perfight mē bee sped in these vertues of the outward thynges. But a man that cannot come to the perfection of this life, oughte to chose a waie to liue, accordyng to the comen lawes. For the operacio of the vnderstandyng speculatiue, is in thend of example of the very beatitude of man: And manne is likened to God and his angels. For the other operacions bee not worthy to be likened to God nor to heuenly thynges. God and his angels haue moste noble life, for thei be euer in the moste best speculacion, & their speculacion neuer wereth nor faileth. And the manne that inforceth hymselk moste contynually

nually to vnderstande & thinke of these thynges, is moste like vnto theim that bee in the very beatitude.

¶ The.liij.Chapiter.

Of the knoweledge of Vertues.

A Man to bee happie in this worlde hath nede of moderate conductingin outward thinges, for because nature geueth not sufficient inwardly of these thynges. As to bee satisfied in brede & of wine, & of other thynges that be nedeful to the life of man. But it is not nedeful to be lorde of the sea and of the land, for suche thynges maie happen to thē that are of lesse degree of riches, that be more ware to bee happy

happy then the Lordes of these thynges. And therfore it is well saied of Anaxagoras: that felicite is not in riches nor in lordeship his saiyng is to be noted, for the woordes of hym are to be alledged, whose woorkes agree with his saiyng. A man that maketh his oriſion accordyng to the obedience of the ordre of the vnderstandyng: is loued of God, If almightie God haue cure of man whiche is a worthy thyng to beleue: Then moste cure he hath of thē that moste inforceth themselfes to be like vnto hym, and best rewardeth theim, and delighteth hym to them, that is to saie, with them as one frende with another. Thē according to this saiyng, we ought to thinke that it is sufficiente to obtaine

felicite

felicite, only to know ẏ thinges written in this boke of vertues and frēdship, and of other thinges, but the accōplishyng is in the operacions. For this thyng that of nature ought to be doen sufficeth not only to be said, but to be doen. And in this forme is fulfilled the goodnesse of man.

¶ The. liiij. Chapiter.

¶ Yet of like matter.

THE knowledge of vertue maketh a māne of power to be admonished vn to good woorkes, specially such as haue good nature and moued by admonision to do well. Also payn maketh a man to flee from vice, for feare of punishement, and not for the

loue of vertue, but for feare of paine, & thinke not well though thei dooe well. It is not possible for theim that bee hardened in malice to be corrected by wordes. There bee menne whiche bee good by teachyng. And those men that bee good by nature haue it not of theim selfes but by the grace of God, whiche is verely called good nature. Then the folie of him that hath the garmente of goodnesse and of righte loue, hateth euill: the mouyng ingendereth vertue in her as doth the seede that is cast vpon good ground. And to the intente that a man haue a good custome from the beginnyng, & to vse to loue thynges that bee good & to hate euil, he ought to be vrought vp frō his youth ac

cordyng

cozdyng to the noble lawes, and
vse the woozkes of vertue: and
this oughte to bee in maner of
continence, although it bee not
delectable to many men, yet the
hande may not bee withdzawen
from chastelyng of childzen, yea
and from childhode till thei bee
greate. There be menne whiche
maie not bee cozrected by wooz-
des. And there bee that cannot
bee by woozdes but by payne.
And there bee other whiche will
not bee cozrected by nother of
these soztes. And those bee to be
take from other. The good and
noble ruler of the citee, maketh
good citezens, whiche obscruc
the lawes and dooy wozke that
it cõmaundeth. Thei be aduer-
saries that obserue not the la-
wes and commaundementes:

although thei dooe well. In di-
uerse Citees there is no good
rule because thei liue dissolutly
in folowyng their willes. The
moste conuenient rule that may
be in citees, is that whiche is tē-
pered prouidently in suche sort
as maie bee kepte not to heuy,
and that whiche manne desireth
to bee obserued in hym and in
his children and in his frendes.
The good punisher of ȳ lawes
is he that maketh rules vniuer
sall, whiche bee determinate in
this boke, and conioyne them
to the perticulars whiche
cometh daily in hādes,
therefore to ordre
the lawes well,
it is nedefull
to haue
reason and experience.

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